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We study Nowak and May’s spatial prisoners’ dilemma game driven by mutations (random choices
of suboptimal strategies) on empirical social networks. The time evolution of the cooperation level is
highly complex containing spikes and steps between quasi-stable levels. A statistical characterization
of the quasi-stable states and a study of the mechanisms behind the steps are given. We argue that the
crucial structural ingredients causing the observed behavior is an inhomogeneous degree distribution
and that the connectionswithin vertices of highest degree are rather sparse. Based on these observations
we construct model networks with a similarly complex time-evolution of the cooperation level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The prisoners’ dilemma (PD) game is a powerful
metaphor for the situation where mutual trust and co-
operation is beneficial in a long perspective but egoism
and guile can produce big short-term profit. Applica-
tions range from evolution of RNA viruses (17), through
westernization of central Africa (4), to the social situ-
ation of soldiers in trench warfare (2) and NASCAR
drivers (15). One of the major achievements has been
to establish the condition for cooperative behavior when
two players meet repeatedly (2). Another direction has
been to investigate the criteria for cooperation to be sta-
ble in social space. In this approach the spatial PD game
by Nowak and May (13) has been the basic model; a
model where there are a number N of players inter-
acting only with players in its immediate surrounding.
Traditionally, spatial games have been studied on regu-
lar lattices; but real social networks are very complexly
organized (18)—being random to some extent, but also
having structure reflecting the social forces. As a step
in this direction people have studied the spatial PD on
more realistic model networks (1; 10). In this Communi-
cation we pursue this idea to the end and let the players’
encounters follow the ties of empirical social networks.
The outcome is a very complex behavior arising from the
interplay between the PD dynamics and the underlying
network structure.
TABLE I Statistics of the networks: The number of vertices
N, the number of edgesM, the average degree in the maximal
subgraph of the ten vertices of highest degree k10, and the cor-
responding expectation value for random graphs of the same
degree sequence k¯10.
network Ref. N M k10 k¯10
pussokram.com (8) 29 341 115 684 1.6 6.0(1)
nioki.com (16) 50 259 239 452 1.2 1.9(1)
emails (7) 40 346 58 224 1.8 4.9(1)
karate club (20) 34 78
We represent the underlying networks as graphs G =
(V,E)whereV is the set ofN players (or vertices) and E is
the set ofM ties (or edges—unordered pairs of vertices)
between them. The networksweuse aremostly acquired
fromonline interaction—throughcontactswithin two In-
ternet communites (pussokram.com and nioki.com) and
through email exchange. (A summary of the used net-
works can be seen in Table I.) Even if the structure of
online interaction network differs from regular acquain-
tance networks, we believe that our results will hold for
a quite large class of social networks. As a small test
network we also use an acquaintance data constructed
from a field survey (the “karate club” network).
InNowak andMay’s spatial PDgame (13) eachplayer,
at each time step, adopts one of two strategies: cooper-
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FIG. 1 Time evolution of the cooperator density ρ for different
networks and values of the temptation b and mutation rate pm
parameters. All these time sequences are typical for the given
set of parameter values except the karate club network that
spends most of the time in the all-D state ρ ≈ 0.
ate C or defect D. To catch the dilemma one lets an en-
counter between two cooperators result in unity gain for
both players, whereas a D-D encounter gives zero gain
for both. However, if a cooperator meets a defector the
cooperator scores zero and the defector scores b ∈ (1, 2)
(b is called ‘temptation’). The gain g(v) of a player v is
the sum of the gains from the encounters with its neigh-
bors. If a neighbor scores higher than a player, the player
follows the high scoring neighbor. But, to drive the sys-
tem (and model occasional irrational moves) a player
chooses the opposite strategy with a probability pm. We
use synchronous updating of the players, i.e. one time
step of the algorithm consists of one sweep (over all the
players) to calculate the individual gains, and one sweep
to update the strategies.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE COOPERATOR LEVEL
Our key quantity is the cooperator densityρ—the frac-
tion of players adopting the strategy C. In regular net-
works the cooperator level is characterized by random
fluctuations and high-frequency oscillations (mostly of
period two, so called ‘blinkers’ (13)). But, as seen in
Fig. 1, when a regular underlying network is replaced
by empirical social networks we get a complex behav-
ior of both upward and downward spikes and steps
between a number of quasi-equilibrium levels. Other
observations of quasi-stable states in games have been
obtained formore complex update rules and larger strat-
egy space (5; 12; 21), or for some special types of directed
ρ
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FIG. 2 Histograms (over 108 time steps) of the cooperator den-
sity. The temptation is 1.35 for both sub-figures, the mutation
rate is 0.001. Lines are guides for the eyes.
networks (10).
The steps between quasi-equilibria in Fig. 1 suggest a
scenario of relatively few stable states, where mutations
on important vertices may cause a shift from one quasi-
stable state to another. To get a better picture we plot a
histogram over ρ (Fig. 2) that indeed has distinct peaks.
For a given b the position and relative height of the peaks
are pm-independent (if pm increases, the noise level of
the histograms gets higher) and thus forms a kind of
fingerprint of the network. We note that the histograms
obtained from one long run or many shorter runs (with
different random seeds) are the same, this indicates that
the system is self-averaging.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE QUASI-STABLE STATES
Nowwe turn to the structure of the quasi-stable states.
To start with a concrete example, in Fig. 3 we study
the karate-club network at the intermediate ρ-level of
Fig. 1(d). In the Fig. 3(a)-configuration 1 vA and vB scores
highest among the border players (players with a neigh-
bor of the opposite strategy). This makes many players,
including the highly connected vC, change strategy to C.
In the Fig. 3(b)-configuration, the defector vB has enough
cooperators in their neighborhood to score higher than
vA, and thus complete the cycle. We note that a crucial
point in sustaining the stability is that vA and vB is not
connected. We also note that if vD is mutated in the
1 We speak of a configuration as the set of strategies of the players at
a given time, and a state as the set of configurations comprising a
period (if the system would evolve without mutations).
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FIG. 3 The configurations of the intermediate quasi-stable state
of the karate club network from time steps 779 597 and 779 598
of the run in Fig. 1(d). The key-players mentioned in the dis-
cussion are marked as squares.
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FIG. 4 (a) cooperator densityρ. (b) average cooperator gain gC.
(c) average defector gain gD. All curves are from the same run
for the pussokram.com network and parameter values pm =
0.001, b = 1.35.
Fig. 3(a) configuration the system would loose its peri-
odicity and stay in a constant configuration (until the
next mutation). This suggests that the quasi-equilibria
in Fig. 1 does not correspond only to one state, but a set
of states that are all close in Hamming distance.
How does the high-ρ states differ from the low-ρ
states? From the update rule to follow the player with
locally highest gain, one expects that defectors gain com-
paratively much in low-ρ and vice versa. This is in-
deed true as shown in Fig. 4 where we plot the average
defector gain gD and cooperator gain gC along with ρ.
One may therefore talk about a high-ρ “cooperator con-
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FIG. 5 The impact of one-player mutations. (a)-(d) shows the
ten ρˆv(t) (the eventual cooperator level if v, and no other vertex,
ismutated and the system relaxed) that differsmost fromρ(t) at
the indicated time steps. The original ρ(t) is indicated together
with the ρ-histogram in (e).
trolled” and a low-ρ “defector controlled” state. The
average defector gain is directly related to the fraction
of boundary (C-D) edges φ—the total defector gain is
the sum of all boundary edges times b, which gives the
following expression for φ:
φ =
gD(1 − ρ)N
bM
. (1)
The values of gD (seen in Fig. 4(c)) means that ∼ 40%
of the edges are border between cooperators and defec-
tors in the “defector controlled” state. This rather many
considering that the biggest cooperator cluster consists
of ∼ 95% of all cooperators (the same figure for defec-
tors is ∼ 63%). These observations suggests numerous
situations where many defectors exploit high-degree co-
operators, like vC is being exploited in Fig. 3(b). (This
picture is confirmed under general circumstances (9).)
IV. THE STEPS IN THE COOPERATOR LEVEL
To investigate the mechanism behind the steps of ρ(t)
we start by again considering the example of Fig. 3. If
themost connected vertex vB (with degree 17) ismutated
fromD toC in the configuration of Fig. 3(a) then g(vB) = 4
while g(vC) = 5.6. In the next time step vB would shift to
vC’s strategy Dwhile vC follows the cooperator vA, so in
fact all vertices except one degree-2 vertex will have the
same strategies as without a mutation on vB. If on the
other hand vBwasmutated in the Fig. 3(b) configuration,
all players would cooperate in the succeeding time step.
By this example we conclude that a vertex’ importance
with respect to mutation is not only dependent on its
degree but also on the current configuration.
For a little more quantitative approach to this problem
we study the result of a one-player mutation as follows:
Starting at time t we run the system without mutations
until one period is completed—this is to start from a
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FIG. 6 Evolution of ρ for model networks. The network pa-
rameters are m = m0 = 3, N = 20 000. The dynamical parame-
ters are b = 1.4 and pm = 0.001.
specific configuration c of the local attractor state. Then
we mutate vertex v and let the system evolve (without
mutations) until one period is completed. Finally we
let the system complete yet a period and look for the
configuration cˆ with the minimal Hamming distance to
c over the period (this is to make the difference zero if
the system would relax back to the same state as prior
to the mutation), and set ρˆv = ρ(cˆ). In Fig. 5(a)-(d) we
plot the ten ρˆv that differsmost from ρ(c) at four different
time steps in four different quasi-stable states. We ob-
serve that the system can change quasi-stable state due
to mutations on single vertices, but at the same time not
go to any other quasi-stable state. Furthermore, there is
only a small number of mutations that actually causes
a transition. Just as in the karate club example above
the configurations comprising a state may vary much
from one time-step to another. This fact explains the
apparent lack of transitions to the ρ ≈ 0.35 state—in
fact, the transition to this state (around t = 8 250) occurs
from a single-player mutation from a configuration in
the ρ ≈ 0.65 peak. As expected, all vertices contributing
to the lines in Fig. 5(a)-(d) have high degree (the low-
est degree is 111). But, as mentioned above, it is not
true that a high degree implies a high importance—for
example, of the ten most connected vertices, on average
5.5 contributes to the tenmost different ρˆv values plotted
in Fig. 5(a)-(d). It is thus not only the structure but the
interplay between the structure and dynamics that gives
rise to the quasi-stable equilibria. As a last point we
note that the quasi-equilibria are stable in the absence of
mutations—if the system at the time steps of Fig. 5(a)-
(d) is evolved without mutation, the largest shift in ρ is
0.008.
V. MINIMAL STRUCTURE CAUSING STEPS AND SPIKES
What features of the network structure are causing the
nonstationary evolution of the cooperator density? As
we have seen, the vertices have to have a highly skewed
degree distribution—so that mutation on one vertex can
cause many vertices, directly or indirectly, change strat-
egy. Furthermore it should not be the case that the ver-
tices of highest degree all are interconnected—then these
would all follow the same strategy, andmost of the other
vertices too, so nothing more than small fluctuations of
ρ, or steps involving almost all vertices, could occur. To
test that there is a bias among themost connectedvertices
not to attach to each other, we sample different networks
with the same degree sequence by randomly rewiring
the original network with the restriction that the degree
of each vertex is preserved (11; 14). The average degree
of themaximal subgraphof the ten vertices of highest de-
gree, k10, and the expectation value of the same quantity
for random graphs with the same degree sequence as G,
k¯10, for the four large networks are shown in Table I. (The
value ten is chosen arbitrarily—any number of the same
order would do.) We see that k10 is indeed significantly
lower than k¯10 for all four networks. Online interaction
represent a somewhat special type of acquaintance net-
work, even if such networks are interesting in their own
right (19), the question if this structure exists in ‘offline’
acquaintance networks is open (and will be discussed
further in Ref. (9)). We also note that if one runs the PD
dynamics on a rewired network one sees spikes but no
quasi-stable states (9).
Networkswith a broaddegreedistribution canbe gen-
erated by, for example, Baraba´si and Albert’s (BA) scale-
free network model (3): Start with m0 disconnected ver-
tices, and grow the network by adding a vertex v with
degreem per time step. An edge from the new vertex are
added to an old vertexwwith a probability proportional
to w’s degree.
We try tomodel the behavior of the cooperator density
by starting from BA model networks with m = m0 = 3
and 20 000 vertices. To tune how much mutually con-
nected the vertices of highest degree are, we make the
subset of the n+ (or n−) vertices of highest degree com-
plete by adding the missing edges (or completely dis-
connected by removing existing edges). As seen in Fig. 6
the steps and spikes of the real-world networks can be
qualitatively reproduced. The resemblance is closest for
removed edges among a small number of hubs Fig. 6(c).
If the edges are removed within a larger set of hubs,
the steps are increasing in frequency and number un-
til the the structure is completely blurred out. If all
missing edges are added within the top n+ connected
vertices, the steps vanishes but the spikes increase in
size and width. An explanation is that when the ver-
tices of highest degree are fully connected, a mutation
of one of these would momentarily increase the number
of cooperators by a large amount and also decrease the
speed of restoration of cooperation. At the same time it
5is well-known that cooperation is promoted in highly-
connected regions (6) which explains the high ρ-value of
the quasi-stable state.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have studied Nowak and May’s spa-
tial PD game on empirical social networks. We find a
complex time-evolution of the cooperator level charac-
terized by large spikes and transitions between a num-
ber of quasi-stable states. The quasi-stable states of low
ρ are characterized by comparatively large gain for the
defectors and large fraction of boundary edges, in quasi-
stable states with high ρ this situation is reversed. We
find that mutations on high-degree players are likely to
be responsible for transitions between the quasi-stable
states; but the outcome of a mutation of a high-degree
vertex is also much dependent on the current configura-
tion. These findings are presented for some specific sets
of parameter values, but they are qualitatively the same
for a broad range of values. We argue that the structure
causing this behavior is a inhomogeneous degree distri-
bution, and that the number of edges within the sub-
set highest-degree vertices is relatively low. Based on
this observation we also construct model networks that
reproduces the steps and spikes of the real-world net-
works. To epitomize, we believe that we have illustrated
how underlying acquaintance patterns can give rise to a
complex time-development of social instability—a pic-
ture that could be empirically testable by carefully ar-
ranged social observations.
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